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commercial greenhouses and florists in the affected area in-
fluenced the court in its holding the ordinance to be unreason-
able.15
It is suggested that the court correctly held the ordinance
unreasonable as applied to plaintiff because commercial and
"light industrial" uses are too similar to justify a differentia-
tion in the absence of an "overriding" public interest. 6 Zoning
ordinances should be passed to remedy some existing or fore-
seeable future evil, not merely to result in some remote or specu-
lative advantage to the community.
Burrell J. Carter
REWARDS-COMMUNICATION OF OFFER AND TIME OF ACCEPTANCE
Appellant in an interpleader action claimed a reward for
information leading to the arrest and conviction of the mur-
derer of the offeror's wife. Some months prior to the murder
which gave rise to the offer, appellant, acting as an informant
for the F.B.I., had conveyed data to an agent concerning a
pistol of the type later used in the murder. According to the
appellant's testimony, on the day following a request published
in news reports for information of the nature already given
the F.B.I., he had met the agent, reminded him of the data con-
cerning the pistol, and asked why it had not been given to the
police. The agent, however, testified that he had given the in-
formation to the police prior to their meeting. Held, that since
the appellant had not acted in response to the offer except to
remind the agent that pertinent information collected several
months before the murder was on file with the F.B.I. and, since
rewards are contractual in nature, there was no meeting of the
minds and consequently no acceptance which could give rise to
a contract. The court considered the conflict in testimony to be
of no importance. Sumerel v. Pinder, 83 So.2d 692 (Fla. 1955).
Offers of rewards may be divided into two principal classes:
(a) Those made by private persons or corporations, and (b)
those made by statute or under statutory authority. Reward
offers by private persons are regarded at common law as con-
15. Id. at 828.
16. See Borough of West Caldwell v. Zell, 22 N.J. Super. 188, 91 A.2d 763
(1952), where the reduction of traffic congestion was held to justify the differ-
entiation between auto repair businesses and truck repair terminals.
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tractual in nature.' Most jurisdictions require both (a) knowl-
edge of the offer,2 and (b) substantial performance in com-
pliance with its terms3 in order for a claimant to recover. In-
sistence on knowledge of the offer logically necessitates per-
formance subsequent to the time the claimant learns of the offer.
4
What may constitute performance is generally determined by
interpretation of the terms of the offer.5 Thus, offers for in-
formation leading to the arrest and conviction of a criminal
have been viewed as requiring information which leads sub-
stantially to both his arrest and conviction.6 Recovery of statu-
tory rewards, however, is placed on a different basis. Per-
formance, even without knowledge, is sufficient in these in-
stances to vest a legal right in a claimant.' Only one jurisdic-
1. "The liability for a reward of this kind must be created, if at all, by con-
tract. There is no rule of law which imposes it except that which enforces con-
tracts voluntarily entered into. A mere offer or promise to pay does not give rise
to a contract. That requires the assent or meeting of two minds and therefore is
not complete until the offer is accepted." Broadnax v. Ledbetter, 100 Tex. 375,
377, 99 S.W. 1111 (1907) ; accord, Williams v. West Chicago Street R.R., 191
Ill. 610, 61 N.E., 456 (1901) ; Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248, 97 Am. Dec. 791
(1868) ; Arkansas Bankers' Ass'n v. Ligon, 174 Ark. 234, 295 S.W. 4 (1927).
2. Lack of knowledge of the offer results in denial of recovery. Arkansas
Bankers' Ass'n v. Ligon, 174 Ark. 234, 295 S.W. 4 (1927) (claimant arrested
bank robber and delivered him to police with no knowledge of the reward) ; Taft v.
Hyatt, 105 Kan. 35, 181 Pac. 561 (1919) (claimants delivered accused into cus-
tody solely for the latter's protection and with no knowledge of offered reward) ;
accord, Fitch v. Snedaker, 38 N.Y. 248, 97 Am. Dec. 791 (1868) ; Broadnax v.
Ledbetter, 100 Tex. 375, 99 S.W. 1111 (1907). 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 59 (1950)
ItESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 53 (1932).
3. Williams v. West Chicago Street R.R., 191 Il. 610, 61 N.E. 456 (1901)
accord, Boyce v. Goodwin, 158 Ark. 475 (1923) ; Haskell v. Davidson, 91 Me. 488,
40 Atl. 330 (1898).
4. Williams v. West Chicago Street R.R., 191 Ill. 610, 61 N.E. 456 (1901);
Smith v. Lancaster County, 29 Pa. Dist. 902 (1920) : "The whole consideration
requesfed by an offer must be given after the offeree knows of the offer." RE-
STATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 53 (1932) ; WILLISTON, SELECTIONS FROM WILLISTON
ON CONTRACTS § 33a (1938). But see Hoggard v. Dickerson, 180 Mo. App. 70, 72,
165 S.W. 1135 (1914); Neville v. Kelly, 12 C.B.N.S. 740, 104 E.C.L. 740, 142
Eng. Rep. 1333 (1862) ; 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 60 (1950). Corbin is much more
lenient in his view, stating that the rule adopted by the Restatement should not
necessarily be followed, and that where the performance is at least completed
after communication of the offer, the offeree may be considered as having received
the complete consideration he has requested.
5. Union County v. Hopkins, 95 N.J. Eq. 444, 450 (1924) ; accord, Henderson
v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 298 S.W. 404 (Tex. Com. App. 1927)
Hoggard v. Dickerson, 180 Mo. App. 70, 165 S.W. 1135 (1914).
6. Shuey v. United States, 92 U.S. 73 (1875) ; Kincaid Trust and Savings
Bank v. Hawkins, 234 Ill. App. 64 (1924) ; Bloomfield v. Maloney, 176 Mich.
548 (1913) ; Genesee County v. Pailthorpe, 246 Mich. 356, 224 N.W. 418 (1929).
7. "It can hardly be said, we think, in a case of this kind, that any con-
tractual relation is contemplated by the legislature, but rather that the right to
the reward follows by operation of law, if a compliance with the provisions of the
statute has been shown." Smith v. State, 38 Nev. 477, 481, 151 Pac. 512, 513
(1915) ; accord, Choice v. Dallas, 210 S.W. 753 (Tex. Civ. App. 1919) ; Auditor
v. Ballard, 72 Ky. (9 Bush) 572, 15 Am. Rep. 728 (1873).
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tion in the United States has seen fit to remove the tenuous dis-
tinction between statutory and private offers and to demand
only substantial performance as a basis for recovery of either
statutory or private rewards.8 Under the civil law, varying posi-
tion are found. In France, the importance of the element of
consent in contract formation necessitates an acceptance in the
case of offers to an indeterminate person or persons ;9 however,
there is no discoverable discussion of the specific problem of
knowledge of the offer at the time of performance as a require-
ment for recovery of rewards. The German Civil Code contains
detailed provisions governing offers of rewards. 10 Article 657
specifically states that knowledge of the offer at the time of
performance is not required." Louisiana courts have never been
faced squarely with the problem of knowledge at the time of
performance as a prerequisite to recovery in reward cases; how-
ever, those cases which have arisen seem to reflect the view
that reward offers are subject to the same rules as other con-
tractual offers. 12
8. Indiana is the only state which gives clear indication of following such a
policy. It is to be noted that this policy may very well be the result of an er-
roneous interpretation of the English case of Williams v. Carwardine, 4 B. & Adol.
621, 110 Eng. Rep. 590 (K.B. 1833), which is inadequately reported, one report
(supra) making no mention of knowledge on the claimant's part, and another, 5
Car. & Payne, 566, 172 Eng. Rep. 1101 (N.P. 1833) merely stating that as claim-
ant lived in county in which reward was offered "she must have known of it."
The interpretation stems from Dawkins v. Sappington, 26 Ind. 199, 201 (1866),
in which a claimant was allowed to recover a reward for the return of a stolen
horse. Claimant had no knowledge of the offer. The court stated in interpreting
the English case above: "It [the decision] was put upon the ground that the offer
was a general promise to any person who would give the information sought....
There are some considerations of morality and public policy which strongly tend
to support the judgment in the case cited. If the offer was made in good faith,
why should the defendant inquire whether the plaintiff knew that it had been
made? Would the benefit to him be diminished by the discovery that the plaintiff,
instead of acting from mercenary motives, has been impelled solely by a desire to
prevent the larceny from being profitable to the person who had committed it?"
See also Sullivan v. Phillips, 178 Ind. 164, 98 N.E. 868 (1912); Everman v.
Hyman, 26 Ind. App. 165, 28 N.E. 1022 (1891) ; Monroe County v. Wood, 39 Ind.
345 (1872).
9. "Quand l'offre s'adresse a des personnes indeterminees, l'acceptation qui
vient 8'y ajouter n'a meins pour resultat de former le contrat." ("When the offer
is made to indeterminate persons, the acceptance which is added thereto has no
less result in forming a contract.") 12 BAUDiY-LACANTINEIE ET BARDE, TRATA
THtORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL, OBLIGATIONS 1, § 30 (3d ed. 1906).
10. GERMAN CIVIL CODE arts. 657-661 (Wang 1907).
11. GERMAN CIVIL CODE art. 657 (Wang 1907): "A person who by public
notice announces a reward for the performance of an act, e.g., for the production
of a result, is bound to pay the reward to any person who has performed the act,
even if he did not act with a view to the reward."
12. Louisiana courts have held that a person returning a portion of stolen
property was entitled to recover a part of the reward proportionate to the value
of the property as compared with the total value of the property lost, Deslondes
v. Wilson, 5 La. 397 (1833) ; the wording of a reward offer determined its terms
NOTES
In the instant case, the Florida court was faced with three
essential questions: (a) Could appellant's conduct in delivering
the information before the murder be regarded as performance?
(b) Was the conflict of testimony between appellant and the
F.B.I. agent of any import? (c) If so, and if the conflict were
resolved in favor of the appellant, could his action in meeting
the agent and reminding him of the information be viewed as
performance? The court answered the first question in the
negative, adopting the traditional contractual approach and
stating that the rendering of the information prior to the offer
could by no construction constitute an acceptance. The second
issue was disregarded by the court. In so doing, the court may
have felt that appellant's action could not have constituted per-
formance anyway, but it departed from the contractual theory
in its failure to resolve the question. The issue was of importance
because appellant's action in reminding the agent of the infor-
mation did occur after communication of the offer. If the agent's
claim that he had conveyed the information to the police prior
to the meeting with appellant had been accepted by the Florida
court, appellant could not have recovered under the contractual
view, for his action prior to the offer could not stand as per-
formance, and his reminder to the agent would have occurred
after the information he possessed had been given to the proper
authorities. However, if the conflict of testimony were resolved
in favor of the appellant, then the remaining question for de-
cision would have been whether the reminder could constitute
performance. It is not to be overlooked that the information
whenever given did result in the arrest of the murderer by the
police, not by the F.B.I., and if appellant's reminder resulted
in the disclosure of the information to the police, this could
have been considered as fulfilling the terms of the offer. By not
reaching the third question the court may have denied appel-
lant a fair chance of recovery. It seems to have been preoccupied
with the fact that appellant came into possession of the informa-
tion and delivered it to the F.B.I. prior to the commission of
the crime. It might have been more properly concerned with
whether his actions could be regarded as performance rendered
with knowledge of the offer. The matter of when appellant ob-
rather than any secret intent of the offerer, Salbadore v. Crescent Mutual Ins. Co.,
22 La. Ann. 338 (1870) ; the offeror of a reward may attach such conditions as
he wishes, and may, if he wish, make himself the sole judge of what shall consti-
tute performance, Protti v. American Bank and Trust Co., 179 La. 39, 153 So.
13 (1934).
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tained the information should have been of no consequence, for
facts in possession of a claimant before the commission of a
crime may be easily divulged thereafter in response to an offer
to pay a reward, thereby completing a contract. If the logic of
this decision is rigidly followed, the result might be to deny
claims which could be considered valid even under a strict con-
tractual theory.
It is submitted that difficulties such as that encountered in
the instant case could be avoided by adoption of a theory similar,
in result at least, to that of the German code. This has been done,
in effect, in the case of statutory offers of rewards. The strict
adherence to the contractual theory in cases involving rewards
for solution and punishment of crime is a survivial of an age
when consensus ad idem was very nearly a judicial obsession.
The German view is based upon sound public policy, and pos-
sibly upon a more enlightened view of the true purpose of
rewards of this nature, which is to bring the guilty to justice,
and not merely to contract with an individual. However the
adoption of such a policy might be accomplished, l8 the law would
be rid of an unnecessary source of complexity were it to impose
upon the offeror of a reward of this type the obligation of paying
the sum he has stipulated upon receipt of the service which he
has requested, without inquiry into motive or knowledge.
George W. Hardy III
STATES - AMENABILITY OF STATE AGENCY TO SUIT
Plaintiff, basing his suit on breach of warranty, sought to
recover from the Louisiana Board of Institutions the value of
twenty registered breeding cows which died from eating al-
13. There are three possible methods by which this might be done in Louisiana:
(1) Enact a statute similar to the German provision. '
(2) It would be possible, unless specific terms to the contrary were contained
in the offer itself, to interpret a reward offer as an offer to pay for a result rather
than an offer to contract for a result, the only acceptance necessary being the sub-
mission of a claim after performance has been rendered.
(3) In addition, the proper result could be achieved by reliance on the concept
of quasi-contract embodied in LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2294 (1870) : "All acts, from
which there results an obligation without any agreement, in the manner expressed
in the preceding article, form quasi contracts. But there are two principal kinds
which give rise to them, to wit: The transaction of another's business, and the
payment of a thing not due." It is to be noted that payment in error and nego-
tiorm geastio are definitely stated not to be the only types of quasi-contract. Thus,
from a theoretical point of view, the introduction of such a policy as suggested
would not have to be fitted into any rigid category, such as unjust enrichment,
payment in error, or negotiorum gestio.
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